Investitionsschutz nur bei Einhaltung der Menschenrechte?

Aus vielen der Blog Einträge ist die Problematik hervorgegangen, die sich für die Menschenrechte ergibt, wo sie im Spannungsverhältnis zu Investitionsabkommen stehen.

Wo Staaten auf Grund wirtschaftlicher Interessen, der Bindung an internationale Investitionsabkommen oder Korruption ihrer Pflicht zum Menschenrechtsschutz nicht nachkommen, ist fraglich welche Schutzmechanismen noch wirksam sein können.

Eine Möglichkeit ist es die Verantwortlichkeit multinationaler Unternehmen stärker zu fordern, die letztlich auch diejenigen sind, die am meisten von den Investitionsabkommen profitieren.

Dazu nötig sind verbindliche Instrumente, mit denen multinationale Unternehmen verpflichtet werden können sich an international vereinbarte Normen im Menschenrechts- und Umweltschutz zu halten.

Ein wichtiges Instrument, das Unternehmen zu einer „corperate responsibility“ veranlassen soll ist der Global Compact.

Ziel des Global Compact ist es, die Geschäftswelt zu einer aktiven Partnerschaft mit den UN-Organisationen zur Förderung der Einhaltung von Menschenrechten, Arbeits- und Sozialnormen und Umweltstandards zu gewinnen. Im Zentrum stehen neun Prinzipien, die sich in den Bereichen Menschenrechte, Arbeits- und Sozialstandards, sowie Umweltstandards auf die wichtigsten internationalen Abkommen beziehen.

Mehr als 300 internationale Unternehmen sind dem Abkommen bereits beigetreten, das in seiner Umsetzung und den Überwachungsmechanismen bisher eher schwach ist und auch keine rechtliche Bindung besitzt.

Die Unternehmen, die dem Global Compact beitreten sichern folgende Punkte zu:

• ihn in ihren Jahresberichten, Unternehmensgrundsätzen und ähnlichen Dokumenten zu befürworten,
• mindestens einmal pro Jahr spezifische Beispiele („best practices“) für die Fortschritte bei der Umsetzung der Prinzipien auf der Web-Site des Global Compact zu veröffentlichen,
• mit den Vereinten Nationen im Rahmen von Partnerschaftsprojekten sowohl auf politischer als auch auf lokaler Ebene zusammenzuwirken.

Auf der Internetseite der internationalen Handelskammer können Unternehmen unter dem Begriff „best practices“ die Maßnahmen vorstellen, die sie zur Verbesserung in den oben genannten Bereichen ergriffen haben. Dies fördert die Transparenz und kann Ansporn für die Unternehmen sein, aktiv zu einer Verbesserung beizutragen. Deutsche Unternehmen, die bisher den Global Compact unterstützen sind Aventis, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Deutsche Bank, Bayer, Gerling Konzern und BASF.

Die OECD-Leitsätze für multinationale Unternehmen (2000) stellen den einzigen multilateral anerkannten und umfassendsten Kodex dar, den Regierungen untereinander vereinbart haben. Es handelt sich um Empfehlungen der Regierung an multinationale Unternehmen dazu, an welche Prinzipien und Standards sie sich in Bezug auf Arbeits-, Menschenrechts- und Umweltschutz halten sollten. Die Unternehmen werden unter anderen Punkten zur Offenlegung von Informationen und zum Kampf gegen Korruption aufgerufen.

Die Umsetzung und Überwachung erfolgt auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene im Rahmen von Regierungen, Unternehmen, Unternehmensverbänden sowie Gewerkschaften, anderen Arbeitnehmerorganisationen und NGOs. Auf nationaler Ebene werden Kontaktstellen zur Leitung der Förderung und Umsetzung der Leitsätze eingerichtet.

Die Effektivität des Global Compact und der OECD-Leitlinien in den Entwicklungsländern hängt immer noch maßgeblich von der Zustimmung und den rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen vor Ort ab, weshalb eine Entwicklungszusammenarbeit von großer Bedeutung ist.

Informationen zu diesen Themen finden sich unter folgenden Adressen:

http://www.bpb.de/

http://www.cora-netz.de/

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses 3

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses

Scope for Non-Parties to an Arbitration to Raise Human Rights Concerns

Even where the two parties are complicit in ignoring the human rights implications of the investment activity – and may prefer to focus their submissions to the Tribunal upon their commercial dispute – there may be procedural scope for non-parties to an arbitration to bring forward human rights facts and arguments for a Tribunal’s consideration. Accordingly, lawyers should be aware that they enjoy the opportunity to introduce these human rights considerations into the arbitral conversation.

For example, in two arbitrations under the NAFTA, Tribunals have indicated that they are minded to allow written submissions by groups wishing to bring forward arguments based upon sustainable development or environmental concerns. In one of these two cases, the Tribunal is still deliberating as to whether amicus curiae may make factual interventions, in addition to legal ones. A more recent BITs dispute has seen a Tribunal reject a request by citizen’s groups and non-governmental organizations to be added as actual parties to the dispute. However, the Tribunal professed to have not prejudged its ability to allow these parties to play a lesser role in the arbitration – either as amicus curiae or as expert witnesses – at some later stage of the proceedings.

In a similar vein, there is some possibility that a home state of an investor, who is party to the BIT in question, might also be able to intervene in an investment treaty arbitration. Typically, it might be expected that the home state’s interests would be in harmony with those of its investor, and that the former would not seek to play any role in the dispute. Indeed, one rationale for including provisions for investor-state arbitration in modern investment treaties had been to “depoliticize” the dispute and to absolve home states from the need to espouse the claims of their investors. However, several recent treaty disputes have demonstrated that investors sometimes enjoy an ability to “treaty-shop” for a viable investment treaty to use in their disputes with a host government. Investors may enjoy the ability to adopt a “home state” of convenience. This situation arises because a number of treaties define an investor’s nationality by reference to where it is legally incorporated – rather than by some more exacting test, such as its primary site of business. As such, some recent investment disputes have seen subsidiaries of US-based investors use BITs signed between the Netherlands with developing or transition economies, in situations where the US had yet to conclude a treaty with the host state. Accordingly, the nominal “home state” of an investor may not have a sense of affinity or loyalty to the investor.

In cases which raise controversial issues, or where the investor has been accused of complicity in human rights violations, the putative home state might be in a position to intervene in a case – particularly where the investor and the host state have both preferred to ignore these “extraneous” human rights concerns. At least one investment treaty (the NAFTA) expressly provides for the right of home states to address Tribunals, however it would be unusual, even where the treaty is silent on the matter, for a Tribunal to not accept arguments from a state, which is, after all, a signatory to the bilateral investment treaty in question.

Much will depend upon the ingenuity and creativity of outside actors who wish to push human rights considerations into the frame – perhaps against the wishes of the two parties to the dispute. Moreover, Tribunals which have reason to believe that an investor may be complicit in grave human rights abuses may be able to exercise their own authority under the relevant arbitral rules to commission expert reports on these issues. In the absence of concrete cases which have grappled with these issues, it would be premature to state with certainty how tribunals would conduct themselves. On the one hand, it is quite clear that Tribunals would be hard-pressed to ignore situations where investors or states are implicated in grave human rights violations of a jus cogens nature. On the other, it is not obvious how less egregious investor conduct would affect that investor’s investment treaty claims. Whereas host states may have clear international treaty obligations to uphold various other human rights, investors are not constrained by equally clear obligations under international law, either under human rights treaties or the relevant investment treaty.

As the obligations of the host state are often clearer, it is to these which we now turn. It will be seen that the failure by a host state to prevent investors from harming various human rights enunciated in international treaties, could give rise to the liability of the host state in human rights forums. Moreover, it will be suggested that where host states do elect to act so as to promote and protect their international human rights treaty obligations, sometimes by regulating or sanctioning investor activity, that there is scope for investment Tribunals to take these competing human rights obligations into account when assessing the manner in which host states have complied with their treaty obligations to foreign investors.

bibliography:

Peterson, Luke Eric/ Kevin R. Gray: International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 2003

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses 2

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses

Disputes Which Implicate Peremptory Norms of International Law

Many treaty arbitrations will include rules of international law as part of the applicable law to the dispute. And in public international law, there is some form of hierarchy whereby treaty obligations, would be of no effect in the event that they conflict with a fundamental peremptory norm of international law. Indeed Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that „a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law“; and Article 64 of the same Convention notes that „if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.“

As a result, jus cogens international laws would seem to be relevant to any arbitration where rules of international law constitute part of the applicable law. Some indication of which international laws carry peremptory status can be found in paragraph 5 of the Commentary to Article 26 the International Law Commission Draft Articles stated:

Those peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include
the prohibitions of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes
against humanity and torture, and the right to self-determination.

Other commentators have noted that prohibitions on forced, compulsory or indentured labour are also universally embraced as human rights violations of universal concern. The prohibition against forced and bonded labour, exploitative child labour and other slave-like practices as well as the freedom to association may also be considered erga omnes international human rights.

Whereas there is no question that a treaty or agreement which was incompatible with these jus cogens rights would be invalid, it is less clear how an investor’s alleged violation of such norms would impact an investment treaty arbitration. The treaty itself would not be invalidated, but the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the substantive merits of the investor’s claims might be invalidated.

In addition to the prospect that tribunals would take these considerations into account, there is also scope for domestic courts to consider egregious investor conduct post facto -if the courts are approached by either party to the arbitration in an effort to annul or enforce the Tribunal’s award. Such recourse to domestic courts is common where one of the parties is unwilling to comply with the arbitral award. There is an expert literature which discusses the grounds under which courts may refuse enforcement or grant annulment of an award, and although these differ from legal system to legal system, they will typically include: the nonarbitrability of a given subject-matter or the violation of public policy. These areas are beyond the scope of the author’s expertise, but signify two important areas which should receive future consideration by researchers interested in the intersection between human rights and investment treaty arbitration. Where Tribunals have ignored important human rights considerations, domestic courts might have some scope to consider these issues.

While arbitral tribunals have yet to face situations where investors are alleged to have been involved in violation of peremptory norms of international law, it should be noted that a Tribunal’s ability to determine the relevance of such issues, is obviously pre-conditioned on that tribunal’s knowledge of the investor’s human rights record in relation to the investment. Recalling that this section of the paper explores those situations where the investor and the host state have chosen to remain silent on these issues, much may depend upon the initiative of outside actors who wish to petition the tribunal to take heed of these considerations.

to be continued

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses 1

Complicity among Investors and Host States in Human Rights Abuses

Limited Relevance of Haman Rights Norms to Such Arbitrations

It is an unfortunate reality that host states are not always minded to place their international human rights commitments at the forefront of their interaction with foreign investor. Indeed, as all nations – but developing countries in particular – increasingly compete for scarce foreign direct investment, it is sometimes the case that host states will ignore their international human rights obligations, or worse, permit them to be openly violated through the actions of State authorities or other third parties. Human rights campaign groups have brought to the fore various instances where foreign direct investment by international corporations has exacerbated or contributed to conflict, having inimical effects upon human rights and human security in the host state.

In a report on the Dabhol Power Corporation’s (a consortium of three US multinationals) operations in India, Amnesty International noted credible allegations of collusion between the foreign investors and the state authorities to suppress human rights, and added that this case was hardly an anomaly.

Amnesty International noted that it had received similar complaints of protestors being “arbitrarily detained, raped and ill-treated” at a number of other industrial and development projects in the country. This is a pattern which has been replicated in other nations which seek to put economic development ahead of domestic human rights considerations. Multinational firms have been accused of complicity in human rights abuses in Nigeria, Burma, Ecuador, Indonesia and Colombia – to refer to only a handful of the more notorious incidents.

On occasion, actions (or inactions) on the part of the host state may violate national or international human rights instruments. Citizens might be entitled to seek relief through local courts or, in some instances, ultimately through international mechanisms such as the complaints mechanism of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or through petition to the European or American Human Rights systems.

Efforts to bring investors to account for human rights breaches may be more difficult, as it is generally states, and not non-state actors, which are accountable for upholding the rights contained in international human rights instruments. As a non-state actor an allegation of violation of human rights through a local court process would be more likely to find an investor liable for torts or criminal violations in relation to its role in the state’s perpetration of human rights abuses.

Provided that the state were not complicit in an investor’s conduct, it might be expected that the state authorities would wish to use the criminal law to sanction investor misconduct. Such sanctions would clearly be in furtherance of human rights interests. If an investor sought to challenge these criminal sanctions through investment treaty arbitration, the case might not even be arbitrable. But, in any case, such an exercise of criminal law would clearly fall within the police powers of a state.

Unfortunately, as the introduction to this section noted, not all host states are keen to enforce human rights compliance of foreign investors. Where the state is recalcitrant, other actors might seek to act. Some public interest groups have mounted a specialized form of litigation which seeks to hold multinational corporations liable for grave human rights breaches committed abroad, through actions such as those available under the home State laws.

It is less clear, however, that the investment treaty arbitration process will offer a useful avenue for redressing most human rights violations related to investment activity. Firstly, arbitral Tribunals in investment disputes will not be able to hear direct claims of violations of human rights. These Tribunals must restrict themselves to considering allegations of violations of the instruments over which they have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction will differ from treaty to treaty, and may be limited to the relevant provisions of the investment treaty in question, to other investment agreements between the parties, or, at its broadest, to “any investment dispute” between the investor and the host state. But in no case, are Tribunals empowered to entertain claims by citizens of human rights violations.

Nor do treaties condition any of the substantive investment rights upon corresponding human rights responsibilities of the investor. In principle, an investment Tribunal could consider illicit activities (such as corruption or bribery which are directly relevant to the investment relationship and which might nullify the relevant investment contract) during the substantive portion of the proceedings. But, there is nothing to suggest that investment Tribunals are empowered as a general rule, to condition investor rights, such as those under a BIT, depending upon whether an investor may have contributed to a host state’s suppression of certain human rights.

For example, if the host state has imposed performance requirements on an investor (for e.g. to hire a certain percentage of locals) in contravention of the BIT, it is unclear what legal grounds there would be for investor rights to be nullified or circumscribed by virtue of the investor’s (and the host state’s) poor human rights record. There is one important exception here. It might be the case that certain egregious human rights violations would preclude a Tribunal from finding jurisdiction in an investment treaty dispute or from finding for an investor on the substance of a dispute.

to be continued

Human Rights Issues Implicated in BITs Disputes

Wie bisher gesehen wurde sind BITs einerseits als eine Methode der Problemlösung zu verstehen aber andererseits lässt sich als Erzeuger anderer Probleme kritisieren. Die Probleme der Menschenrechte bei BITs Disputes stelle ich jetzt vor.

Folgender Text ist die kleine Einführung in das Thema.

While there has been some work undertaken to explore the relationship between the multilateral trading system and human rights, there have been fewer inquiries into the relationship between the international governance frameworks for investment and human rights. Doubtless, this owes a great deal to the fact that, to the extent investment is governed by international rules; this is primarily through less-visible bilateral and regional treaties. It likely also owes to the fact that investment treaty dispute settlement is dispersed, ad-hoc and often opaque. As such, even where investor arbitrations might harbour implications for human rights, these cases might not necessarily come to public notice. Clearly, there is a need for immediate reform of the dispute settlement processes, so that cases may not proceed without publicity.

For purpose of analysis, two general scenarios where there is an interface between investment treaty arbitration and human rights can be envisioned.

The first of these involves those situations where the host state’s treatment of an investor can be argued to have been in furtherance of certain international human rights commitments of the host state. This might include ordinary exercises of state authority (for example under criminal law) to sanction foreign investors which are alleged to have violated the human rights of local citizens. It might also include situations where host states act proactively so as to further human rights, rather than in a merely reactive manner (i.e. in response to investor wrong-doing).

A second and very different scenario where investment treaty arbitration and human rights may intersect is in those situations where both parties to an investment dispute appear to have been complicit (either by their actions or their omissions) in allowing human rights violations to be perpetrated by the state or by corporate actors (with the blessing or acquiescence of the state). In this scenario, neither party is claiming that its actions were pursuant to international human rights obligations. While compliance, or otherwise, with these human rights norms may be adjudicated in other bodies, it is unclear what role an investor’s human rights record will play in the substantive deliberations of an investment treaty arbitration.

ausführlich : www.iisd.org

Investment Protection Treaties and Human Rights II

 

A common investment treaty provision is an obligation to provide foreign investors with “full protection and security”. This undertaking obliges states to exercise “due diligence” in ensuring the protection of foreign investments. In a recent investment treaty arbitration against Mexico, a Spanish multinational company alleged that state authorities breached this undertaking, by failing to act as quickly and thoroughly as possible in order to “prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations” that had dogged the investor’s controversial hazardous-waste treatment facility. In short, this was one of those common instances where critics and protestors exerted pressure on a controversial foreign investment proj­ect so as to cause inconvenience and loss to the foreign-owned business.

For its part, the investment tribunal faced a potential situation where it would need to determine whether the state had failed to guarantee “full protection and security” to the foreign investors. However, the tribunal noted that, in this instance, there was “not sufficient evidence supporting the allegation that the Mexican authorities, whether municipal, state or federal, have not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the direct action movements conducted by those who were against the landfill.”

The tribunal’s opinion was notable for offering a reference to “parameters inherent in a democratic state”, seemingly recognizing the obligation for a democratic state to ensure the right of protest. However, the tribunal gave no indication of how to balance this human rights obligation with the obligation to provide foreign investors with “full protection and security”. In this case, the claimant’s failure to provide sufficient evidence regard­ing the conduct of the Mexican authorities meant that the tribunal did not need to address this delicate subject further. Nevertheless, it is a question that may arise in subsequent disputes.

As it seems that investor-state disputes can raise certain human rights concerns, then clearly the human rights community ought to devote great­er attention to the burgeoning international law of foreign investment.

Less clear is how investment tribunals will address those human rights concerns. Often, the applicable law governing investment treaty arbitra­tions will include “applicable rules of international law”, thereby open­ing the way for tribunals to consider a host state’s international human rights obligations. However, it is less clear that tribunals will fairly weigh these competing international legal obligations of states, or that they are equipped to undertake the sensitive balancing of investor protections and human rights.

 

Often, arbitrators are drawn from the ranks of practicing investment lawyers, and will have a commercial arbitration background. Human rights specialists are rarely found on these tribunals, although a party would be free to appoint an individual with a human rights orientation as one of the three presiding arbitrators.

A more elementary challenge, however, is the fact that arbitrations almost always occur behind closed doors, rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain how human rights arguments are relevant to a given arbitra­tion. While the final decision of the tribunal may be relied upon to reveal what the tribunal thought of any human rights dimension, these decisions are not always made public, and only under the ICSID system are deci­sions routinely published.

Given the potential for human rights issues to crop up in future invest­ment treaty disputes, there is a need for human rights professionals to familiarize themselves with the features of the emerging international regime on foreign investment. Ongoing negotiations of new investment treaties, as well as arbitrations under existing treaties, may harbor impli­cations for human rights.

While investment treaty arbitration suffers from a lack of transparency, there are some tools at the disposal of the public to track this field. Likewise, there have been some efforts by concerned parties to intervene in ongoing investment treaty arbitrations, so as to bring human rights considerations to the attention of tribunals. Looking to the future, further initiatives will be necessary to educate and inform the human rights community about the growing relevance of foreign investment law to human rights.

 

 

Bibliography:

Peterson, Luke: Human Rights, Trade and Investment matters, in: Amnesty International, 2006

oder erhältlich auf der Seite:

www.amnestyusa.org/business/HRTradeInvestmentMatters.pdf

Investment Protection Treaties and Human Rights I

Im folgenden Artikel handelt es sich um die Problematik der Investitionsschutz und der Menschenrechte. Ich denke, hier ist die generelle Spannungsverhältnisse zwischen beiden verständlich dargestellt.

Der Artikel ist relativ lang, also stelle ich hier den ersten Teil, und gleich letzteren Teil.

  

 

Investment Protection Treaties and Human Rights

For several decades, governments and business interests have sought to draft a so-called Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). Such an agreement would provide high levels of international legal protection for businesses investing in other territories. The MAI project has met with fierce public opposition from groups and individuals concerned with development, the environment, social justice and human rights.

 

Although both the OECD and the WTO have failed in their efforts to conclude a multilateral framework for protection of foreign investment, efforts have proven much more fruitful at the bilateral and regional level. Each year, literally dozens and dozens of bilateral investment treaties are concluded in negotiations that rarely garner any media attention or scru­tiny from civil society groups.

Today, upwards of 2,400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been negotiated, along with hundreds more free trade agreements (FTAs) containing some form of protection for foreign investments.

The steady growth of international investment protections—whether they are found in purpose-built BITs, broader FTAs, or in a yet-to-be-realized MAI—harbor clear implications for human rights.

As a rule, investment treaties are one-sided instruments. They are concerned with limiting the measures that may be taken by governments against foreign investors or foreign-owned investments. The treaties contain a series of rights for inward capital—protection against expropria­tion, guarantees of non-discrimination, and freedom to transfer funds out of a host state—but they lack any counter-balancing investor responsibilities.

 

In the event of investor misconduct that impacts on the rights of indi­viduals or groups in the territory where the investment takes place, the treaties offer little comfort to those victims—investor protections are not conditional on minimum investor responsibilities, nor do they provide any mechanism for challenging investor wrong-doing.

 

Simply because the treaties are silent on human rights does not indicate that they have no impact upon human rights. Most investment treaties contain an innovative dispute settlement mechanism that offers foreign investors direct legal personality under international law to mount disputes against their host government. Generally, governments give an “open invitation” in the treaty to submit to arbitration any investment disputes that should arise between themselves and a foreign investor of a state that is a treaty signatory. These legal disputes may center upon a variety of alleged intrusions by host governments against foreign investors, includ­ing allegations that certain regulations, laws or policies have a significant negative impact upon the investor’s operations.

 

Arbitrations between investors and states are occurring in increasingly large numbers, thanks to the broad offers of arbitration contained in the treaties.Some of the most high profile of these international lawsuits have arisen under the investment chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Indeed, certain of these NAFTA claims have attained a degree of notoriety because they involved investor challenges to health or environmental measures imposed by a NAFTA government on a foreign investor.

However, while NAFTA attracts the lion’s share of attention, the majority of investor-state arbitrations take place under other international invest­ment treaties—most of them obscure bilateral treaties. Moreover, while the NAFTA governments (Canada, Mexico and the United States) have committed to publicize all arbitrations arising under that agreement, arbitrations under bilateral treaties come to public attention much less frequently, as there are few transparency obligations contained in such treaties.

This lack of transparency in foreign investment dispute settlement is critical, because states may face disputes when their international commitments on investment protection come into tension with their international (and national) obligations to protect human rights.

Research by the author for the International Institute for Sustainable Development has highlighted one notable area where the two legal regimes may interact: privatization of drinking water concessions in developing countries.

To date, some nine arbitrations arising out of foreign investments in the water sector have been lodged at the World Bank’s investment arbitration facility, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). While the details of each dispute differ—and public information about some of them is limited—some of the cases do implicate sensitive regulatory questions relating to water quality, the pricing of water, access to water for those unable to pay, and the expropriation of public wells.

Governments playing host to such foreign investments may be bound under international law to work towards achieving the full realization of the right to water for its population. So governments might find them­selves in situations where regulatory measures taken in pursuit of that obligation might come into friction with broad protections contained in bilateral investment treaties designed to limit the types of regulatory and administrative treatment to which foreign investors may be subjected.

 

Fortsetzung folgt.

 

Notwendigkeit der BITs

Mit der Globalisierung erweitert sich die Auswirkung der internationalen Unternehmen, allerdings sind die Unternehmen kein völkerrechtliches Subjekt, damit sind sie weder an das Völkergewohnheitsrecht noch an die internationalen Verträge bindend.

Um diese Einschränkungen zu überwinden schließen die Staaten BITs (bilateral investment treaty/ ein anderes Word FDI : Foreign direct investment) ab, damit die Staaten für die Aktivitäten der jeweiligen Unternehmen Verantwortung nehmen. Natürlich sind diese BITs nicht ausreichend die menschenrechtlichen Probleme zu lösen. Nicht selten genießen die Prozesse über solche Fälle lacuene in law (wie Gesetzeslücke). Also sind die Bemühungen um diese Problematik notwendig.

Hinweis für BIT:

A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is an agreement establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one state in the state of the other. This type of investment is called Foreign direct investment (FDI). BITs are established through trade pacts.

Most BITs grant investments made by an investor of one Contracting State in the territory of the other a number of guarantees, which typically include fair and equitable treatment, protection from expropriation, free transfer of means and full protection and security. The distinctive feature of many BITs is that they allow for an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, whereby an investor whose rights under the BIT have been violated could have recourse to international arbitration, often under the auspices of the ICSID (International Center for the Resolution of Investment Disputes), rather than suing the host State in its own courts.

There are currently more that 2500 BITs in force, involving most countries in the world. Influential capital exporting states usually negotiate BITs on the basis of their own „model“ texts (such as the US model BIT).

ICSID : International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

Noch eine weitere Einführung zum Thema „Human Right and Investment Protection in International Disputes“

In Fällen der Investment Disputes spielt ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) bzw. die ICSID Konvention als ein multinationaler Vertrag eine wichtige Rolle . Derzeit sind 155 Staaten in diesen Vertrag eingetreten.

Folgendes ist allgemeine Infomation über ICSID, soll grob im Hinterkopf behanten werden.

ICSID is an autonomous international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID or the Washington Convention) with over one hundred and forty member States. The Convention sets forth ICSID’s mandate, organization and core functions. The primary purpose of ICSID is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes.

The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). It was opened for signature on March 18, 1965 and entered into force on October 14, 1966.

The Convention sought to remove major impediments to the free international flows of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the absence of specialized international methods for investment dispute settlement. ICSID was created by the Convention as an impartial international forum providing facilities for the resolution of legal disputes between eligible parties, through conciliation or arbitration procedures. Recourse to the ICSID facilities is always subject to the parties’ consent.

As evidenced by its large membership, considerable caseload, and by the numerous references to its arbitration facilities in investment treaties and laws, ICSID plays an important role in the field of international investment and economic development.

Today, ICSID is considered to be the leading international arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement.

Ausführliche Info :

http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp ;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Centre_for_Settlement_of_Investment_Disputes

Human Rights and Investment Protection in International Disputes

Internationaler Schutz der Menschenrechte auf der einen Seite und Investitionsschutz für multinationale Unternehmen auf der anderen – die beiden Interessen kollidieren in vielen Regionen der Erde. Dabei sind die Zusammenhänge zwischen wirtschaftlichen Vorgängen und daraus resultierenden Problemen menschenrechtlicher Natur kompliziert und oft nicht sofort ersichtlich; entsprechend schwierig ist es, einen Ausgleich zu finden.

Die Entwicklungen im Zuge der Globalisierung haben zu einem rasanten Wandel in der internationalen Wirtschaft geführt, einem starken Anstieg des Außenhandels und der Auslandsinvestitionen. Gestützt wird diese Entwicklung vom technologischen Fortschritt zum einen und davon, dass bilaterale Investitionsförderungs- und Schutzabkommen die Rahmenbedingungen schaffen, auch in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern Märkte zu erschließen. Die Zahl solcher Abkommen ist besonders seit den 80er Jahren sprunghaft gestiegen. Davon profitieren in erster Linie wirtschaftliche Privatpersonen, denen Investitionsschutzabkommen zwischen ihrem Heimatland und dem jeweiligen Zielland Sicherheiten gewähren wie z. B. Eigentumsschutz, bzw. angemessene Entschädigung im Falle von Enteignung, Garantie des freien Transfers von Kapital und Erträgen, sowie Vereinbarung einer internationalen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit bei Streitigkeiten zwischen Investor und Gastland. Auf Auslandsinvestitionen und Investitionsschutzverträge möchte ich detaillierter in einem späteren Eintrag eingehen.

Auch im Menschenrechtsschutz haben sich seit der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte vom 10. Dezember 1948 viele weitere Normen und Verträge mit internationaler Gültigkeit entwickelt. Auch hierzu werde ich in einem späteren Eintrag mehr schreiben. Sowohl bei Menschenrechtsnormen, als auch bei wirtschaftlichen Abkommen ist das Ziel, das Individuum vor Übergriffen durch den Staat zu schützen, jedoch wird die Umsetzung nicht gleich effektiv betrieben.

Es gibt multinationale Konzerne, deren enorme wirtschaftliche und politische Stärke die der staatlichen Akteure in dem Entwicklungsland, in dem sie tätig sind übersteigt. Ihr Handeln kann daher direkten Einfluss auf große Teile der Bevölkerung dieses Landes haben und sollte von entsprechender sozialer Verantwortlichkeit begleitet sein. Da dies häufig nicht der Fall ist und auch der Wettbewerb unter den Entwicklungsländern selbst die Staaten dazu treiben kann, ihre Regulationen und Menschenrechtsstandards abzusenken, sind solche multinationalen Unternehmen oft relativ ungebunden in ihrem wirtschaftlichen Handeln. Wie groß ihre politische Macht und Einflussnahme in einzelnen Ländern tatsächlich sein kann, ist umstritten. Tatsächlich werden aber immer wieder Verbindungen ausländischer Investitionen mit Menschenrechtsverletzungen aufgedeckt. Ein einfaches Beispiel hierfür wären Unternehmen, die von den niedrigen Lohnkosten ihrer Niederlassungen im Ausland profitieren, wo die Menschenrechte der Arbeiter missachtet werden.

Fragen, mit denen man sich in diesem Themenblock beschäftigen kann sind: Wo treten Konflikte zwischen Menschenrechtsschutz und wirtschaftlichen Verträgen verstärkt auf, wer sind die beteiligten Akteure? Wo sollten menschenrechtliche Grundprinzipien zu einer stärkeren Regulation wirtschaftlicher Vorgänge in Bezug auf den Menschenrechtsschutz verpflichten? Welche Möglichkeiten gibt es die Umsetzung und Effektivität von Menschenrechtsnormen zu steigern und gleichzeitig die Verlässlichkeit und Stabilität, die Investitionsabkommen gewähren, aufrechtzuerhalten?